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Hospital Tort Liability
Aaron Jacobson*
66fUBLIC BENEFIT ACTIVITIES" of a hospital, university or wel-
U fare agency have been looked upon with special favor by
the law for many decades-a genuine kind of legalistic paternal-
ism. They being institutions of beneficent motive, the policy of
the judiciary has been to aid them through notable departures
from the rules. Arguments to the contrary met a stone wall of
"public policy," a doctrine here blessed and there cursed since
the day the law took on the blush of social consciousness.
One such departure is exemplified in the immunity from lia-
bility for the tortious conduct of their employees that hospitals
have enjoyed. Thus, a patient injured through negligence while
in the care of a hospital often had no recourse, no matter how
severe the injury or how gross the negligence, in the past; and if
he died, his dependents were similarly left without remedy.
A Brief History
The precedent for this departure was laid down in American
courts in an 1876 Massachusetts ruling' and was followed closely
by a Maryland decision in 1885.2 Both courts, thinking that they
were following earlier English rules, answered this question in
the negative:
Should a non-profit hospital, some of whose funds are
obtained through gifts and charitable contributions, given
with the intent that they shall be used in furtherance of the
good will, be made to pay from these funds for the wrongful
conduct of its servants, particularly where the injured party,
as a patient, is a beneficiary of the charity?
In short, the major premise in law that all wrong-doers must
pay was altered to except the charitable institution.
Oddly enough, both the Massachusetts and the Maryland
courts, in following the English cases, were apparently unaware
that the earlier rulings were each reversed by the same English
* A second year student, graduate of Ohio State University, and Editorial
Staff Member of the Cleveland News.
1 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432.
2 Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20.
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courts, the last in 1871, five years before the Massachusetts case.3
Hence, if stare decisis were the justification for the first American
court ruling, it was obsolete when laid down, and all subsequent
accords in this country may have been similarly misled. Many
courts have since made reference to this fact: the Massachusetts
court resurrected a rule five years after it had been repudiated in
England.
Arguments Pro
This conclusion, however, sidesteps the real issues in the con-
troversy. Courts have long thought hospitals to be masters un-
like others, and that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply to them "because they derive no benefit from what their
servants do, in the sense of that personal and private gain . . ." 4
There is the further inclination to weigh the wrongs, as in Mag-
nuson v. Swedish Hospital, where the court stated: "While the
application of the rule to individual cases may sometimes seem
harsh and the result regrettable, there are very few doctrines of
law of which the same may not be said with equal truth. When
viewed in the light of a broader vision, however, we are convinced
that the individual hardships wrought are offset many times over
by the encouragement and stimulation which the rule of non-
liability gives to the establishment and maintenance by private
charity of institutions devoted to the care of the halt, the lame
and the blind, and to the relief of those suffering from physical or
mental disease and affliction." 5
Public policy is perhaps the strongest rationale invoked in
support of the exemption. It was given one of its boldest ex-
pressions by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1948, which
held: "The exemption ... rests not upon the relation of the in-
jured person to the charity, but upon grounds of public policy,
which forbids the crippling or destruction of charities which are
established for the benefit of the whole public ... The principle
is that, in organized society, the rights of the individual must, in
3 The dictum of non-liability set forth in Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Engl. Re-
print 934 (1839) was reversed in Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 Engl.
Reprint 1500 (1866), and the similar rule (which the Mass. court cited as
its sole authority) in Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Engl. Reprint 769 (1861)
was overruled in 1871 in Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, L. R. 6 Q. B. 214.
4 Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Nebr. 279 (1955).
5 Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 P. 828 (1918).
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some instances, be subordinated to the public good. It is better
for the individual to suffer injury without compensation than for
the public to be deprived of the benefit of the charity. The law
has always favored and fostered public charities in ways too
numerous to mention, because they are most valuable adjuncts
of the state in the promotion of many of the purposes for which
the state itself exists." 6 (Emphasis added.)
Again, in Weiss v. Swedish Hospital: "When we consider the
great diversity of variant rules which might be adopted, and at
the same time remember that the rule with which we are dealing
does not apply to hospitals alone but to churches, educational in-
stitutions, Y. M. C. A.'s, social welfare organizations, and in gen-
eral, to the various organizations engaged in philanthropic,
benevolent, and charitable work, it is at once manifest that a
change in the rule, particularly its complete abandonment, would
have far-reaching and, perhaps, unimagined and unintended con-
sequences ... 7
There is also the "trust fund" theory upon which non-liabil-
ity was based. It holds that "as a charitable institution, its funds
are held in trust for the particular charitable purpose for which
they were given, that it is a breach of trust to apply such funds
to any other purpose, that payment of damages in tort actions
is not a purpose contemplated by the trust, and that, therefore,
such funds cannot be diverted to the payment of such dam-
ages.. 8
Arguments Contra
The "trust" theory was attacked in a very recent case on
this question, Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 0. S. 5, decided
July 18, 1956, when the Ohio Supreme Court reversed its 45-year-
old rule and held the hospital answerable in tort.
In a brief amicus curiae submitted on behalf of the plaintiff
by the Cleveland (0.) law firm of Harrison, Spangenberg & Hull,
hospitals were described as being "big business," and "less than
three per cent of the total hospital income (in Cuyahoga County
with a 1,500,000 population) now comes from charitable donors."
The 1955 income of that community's hospitals was set at $60,-
000,000. Of that amount, $58,000,000 was said to come from
6 Gaughman v. Columbia Y. M. C. A., 47 S. E. (2d) 788.
7 Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. (2d) 446, 133 P. (2d) 978 (1943).
8 Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 191 (1931).
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private sources "with the vast majority of this sum coming from
hospitalization insurance plans paid for in advance by the pa-
tient."
Cited at length by the Ohio court is the now-famous opinion
of Judge Rutledge, which reads in part:
"... Insurance must be carried (by hospitals) to guard
against liability to strangers. Adding beneficiaries cannot
greatly increase the risk or premium. This slight additional
expense cannot have the consequences so frequently feared
in judicial circles, but so little realized in experience. To off-
set the expense will be gains of eliminating another area of
what has been called 'protected negligence,' and the anomaly
that the institutional doer of good asks exemption from re-
sponsibility for its wrong, though all others must pay. The
incorporated charity should respond as do private individuals,
business corporations and others, when it does good in the
wrong way." 9
The public policy doctrine, when applied against the rule,
took this form:
"'Public policy' simply means that policy recognized by the
state in determining what acts are unlawful or undesirable,
as being injurious to the public or contrary to public good.
It is not quiescent but active. A policy adopted today as be-
ing in the public good, unlike the Ten Commandments, is not
necessarily an ever-enduring thing. As times and prospec-
tives change, so changes the policy. .. " 10
It is now 80 years since the rule was founded in the United
States. During that period, hospitals have grown from small,
needy charities where only the very sick or dying went, to huge
edifices, now averaging 500 beds, which
"own and hold large assets, much of it tax free, by statute, and
employ many persons... Also, we take judicial notice of the
extensive use of the many types of hospital insurance, as
well as liability insurance by the institutions. Thus it is evi-
dent that times have changed and are now changing in the
business, social, economic and legal worlds. The basis for
and the need of such encouragement is no longer existent." 11
It has been stated that prior to 1942, the rule was virtually
universal in the United States, and that following Judge Rut-
ledge's "devastating opinion," there has come
9 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810
(1942).
10 Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Assn., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. (2d) 151.
11 Ibid, pages 1273-4.
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"a flood of recent decisions holding that a charity is liable for
its torts to the same extent as any other defendant. In addi-
tion to the District of Columbia, the immunity is now re-
pudiated in Arizona, Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
York within the limits of its peculiar independent contractor
theory, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Peurto Rico, Utah, Ver-
mont and Washington (and now Ohio)." 12
That the courts have engaged in a good deal of soul-searching
when asked to review the rule is evident throughout the recent
decisions bearing on the subject. Judge Hamley, writing the
majority opinion in Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital
Association in 1953 observed that
"if we were to judge the question before us solely upon a
factual basis-whether there still prevail the conditions or
circumstances which led our court, in 1918, to find that pub-
lic policy required immunity-mthe considerations discussed
above strongly indicate a negative answer. When we add to
these considerations the searching criticisms which have been
leveled at the justness and legal soundness of the rule, its
repudiation seems almost compelled." 13
The Ohio court, in writing on the Avellone case, considered
"the other side of the picture-the patient injured, killed or
maimed by the negligence of servants of the hospital."
It enumerated the following: A. "A nurse had, by negli-
gence in counting the sponges used in an operation, allowed a
sponge to remain in the patient's body, causing her death." B. "A
student assistant was alleged to have negligently administered to
the patient an injection of scalding hot water immediately follow-
ing an operation on him for appendicitis and while he was under
the influence of ether." C. "It was alleged that the patient died
by virtue of the negligent infusion of boric acid instead of a saline
solution." 14
The rule, now discarded by the Ohio court, had denied re-
covery in each of these cases.
Still another facet was unturned-that of constitutional
rights-when the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed, in 1954, its
own immunity doctrine set forth in 1916. In discarding non-
liability, the court noted that
12 Prosser on Torts 787, Sec. 109 (2d Ed., 1955).
13 Pierce v. Yakima Valley etc., 43 Wash. (2d) 173.
14 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, supra.
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"it is somewhat surprising to note that in none of the deci-
sions establishing the immunity doctrine in this state was the
question ever presented or consideration given to the provi-
sions of our constitution. Section 18 of our bill of rights
reads: 'All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputa-
tion or property, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and justice administered without delay' . . . Neither our con-
stitution nor our statute says anything about releasing chari-
table, educational or religious organizations from liability
for negligence which results in personal injuries to another
... It is the primary duty of the courts to safeguard the dec-
laration of right and remedy . . . To exempt charitable and
non-profit corporations from liability for their torts is plainly
contrary to our constitutional guarantees. It gives to certain
favored ones, selected arbitrarily, immunity from that equal
liability for civil wrongs which is a sign of equality between
citizens ... In short, it destroys equality and creates special
privilege." 15
Lineup of the States
The years following the first laying-down of the rule saw
changes being wrought by the courts confronted with it. Among
the three major categories of complainants-the stranger, the em-
ployee, and the patient or beneficiary-the rule was relaxed or
changed in many ways and by many courts, with the result that
in recent years, the rule has become a tangled maze of exceptions
and contradictions.
But the trend is unmistakable. On a roll call, only seven
jurisdictions would grant complete immunity to hospitals. They
are Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon and
South Carolina.
Partial immunity (where in the majority the hospital is
liable only if negligence can be proved in the hiring of an em-
ployee) is permitted by Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wis-
consin and Wyoming.
In Rhode Island, listed above, the immunity is established by
statute. In Maryland, while the courts there hold to the non-
liability, a statute overcomes it so long as the hospital carries lia-
bility insurance.
15 Noel v. The Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 763.
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To Prof. Prosser's list of those 19 jurisdictions denying im-
munity (supra) must be added three states, Georgia, Illinois
and Tennessee, where execution on a tort judgment may be
levied against liability insurance or other non-trust property.
The lineup is now: 23 jurisdictions favoring immunity in
one form or another; 22 denying it, and the remaining ones
either doubtful or having no reported cases.
Summary
The plaintiff's attorney in the Avellone case (supra), Ellis
B. Brannon of Cleveland, 0., whose arguments before the Ohio
Supreme Court ended in a reversal of the non-liability rule, made
this comment to the writer:
"A tortured version of an archaic rule has been modified
in Ohio. The fairness of the decision affords the charity, the
complainant and the insurer an opportunity to adjust to case
situations which will require amplification of legal principles
not especially spelled out in the court's decision. It would
seem that Ohio courts should apply the New York rule, dis-
tinguishing between a medical act and an administrative one,
which preserves the role of the private physician as an inde-
pendent contractor (as in the case of Schloendorff v. Society
of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125). This places all par-
ticipants in a position to enjoy a rule intended to be ex-
pansive enough to cover new situations as they arise."
Another attorney and member of the Michigan and New
York bars, Milo 0. Bennett, carried in the frontispiece of his
work, "That Book About Hospitals" (1953), an excerpt from
stenographer's minutes, which may bear repeating:
".... The Court: There are many other eleemosynary in-
stitutions in this country that have the benefit of immunity,
churches for instance. If you put hospitals in the class of
commercial institutions, why should not churches also be
deprived of their immunity and also be left at the mercy of
all the greedy personal injury claimants who come along?
Mr. Bennett: In a moment I want to take an exception
to that remark from the bench about greedy personal injury
plaintiffs, but first, your Honor will, of course, permit me to
answer the Court's question. It is this. There is no simi-
larity between a church and a hospital in their functions.
Lord knows there is no similarity in their behavior toward
the human beings who attend. That ghastly shroud of im-
munity can be stripped from the hospitals without affecting
at all the tax-exemptions and freedom from liability of our
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
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places of worship. But let me say this, your Honor, very re-
spectfully: if and when church attendance becomes com-
pulsory, as hospital attendance most certainly is, and they
charge you a pew rent of ten to fifty dollars a day in advance
for every twenty-four hours you spend there, and a grouchy
usher may seat you in a pew giving off fatal electric shocks,
or they give you prussic acid in the communion wine, or you
may suffer in your church any of the other hundred same
disasters that happen in hospitals day after day, interminably,
then-if your Honor can conceive of that time ever coming
-then, your Honor, churches should also be stripped of
their immunities. Then, your Honor, they will be no better
than the hospitals. Have I answered your Honor's question?
The Court: You have no need to shout. My hearing is
perfect."
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